A common concern about expert advice in politics is that it can undermine accountability: by claiming to have "followed the expert," politicians can pursue private agendas without facing electoral punishment. I identify when this concern is justified by analyzing a model in which an incumbent either sets policy directly or first consults an expert advisor whose recommendation is private. I show that when voters cannot distinguish genuine, policy-improving consultation from consultation used to mask rent-seeking, the expert grants incumbents the cover they lack when implementing policy without advice. This cover arises only when the advisor is informative enough that some incumbents genuinely defer to her, and where it arises, accountability weakens on two margins: more incumbents pursue policies that are unlikely to serve voters, and those who do so are punished less. Therefore, the possibility of seeking experts' advice can reduce voter welfare, despite the genuine informational gains it provides.

@unpublished{touolameda_placeholder2,
  author = {Touola Meda, Francis},
  title  = {[Paper Title Here]},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Working paper}
}

Studies of authoritarian governance attribute their longevity and economic underperformance to the loyalty-competence trade-off: rulers sacrifice subordinates' competence by hiring incompetent but loyal agents. However, the theory fails to explain how many autocrats maintain longevity while simultaneously achieving economic prosperity. I endogenize loyalty and competence in a two-level principal-agent model between a ruler, a pool of subordinates, and a representative citizen with two core innovations. Policy outcomes can affect regime stability, and there is no institutionalized succession process. The model generates clear predictions about how two key elements - the threat of social protests and uncertainty regarding the policy preference of any successor ruler - shape the loyalty-competence trade-off. I then explore two extensions of the model, revealing counterintuitive findings. First, the shadow of democratization increases the set of kleptocratic regimes characterized by long tenures and poor economic performance. Second, a smooth succession, which is the process by which autocrats can transfer power to their offspring, reduces the set of kleptocratic regimes

@unpublished{touolameda_placeholder1,
  author = {Touola Meda, Francis},
  title  = {[Paper Title Here]},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Working paper}
}

An important public policy question is whether increasing the public sector wage can curb corruption. With the existing theory and empiric overall ambiguous in this regard, I developed a moral hazard and adverse selection model of job application and selection with the assumption that individuals in the job market differ in their Public Service Motivation (PSM). I show that an increase in the public sector wage has two opposing effects on corruption. An incentive effect (higher wages increase the opportunity costs of engaging in corruption for individuals willing to enter the pool of potential recruits before the wage increase) and a selection effect (higher wages attract individuals with lower PSM who are more likely to engage in corruption). An increase in the public sector wage reduces (increases) corruption if and only if the incentive effect dominates (is dominated by) the selection effect. I show that if the semi-elasticity of the public labor supply, which is the percentage of the labor supply as a unit change of the public sector wage, is decreasing (increasing), the incentive effect dominates (is dominated by) the selection effect. In addition, I show that if the semi-elasticity is non-monotone, a trade-off may exist between reducing corruption and increasing the total revenue collected.

@unpublished{touolameda_placeholder1,
  author = {Touola Meda, Francis},
  title  = {[Paper Title Here]},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Working paper}
}

A central finding in the study of political inequality is representational inequality by affluence: government policies reflect the preferences of the rich much better than those of the poor. Though many scholars and policymakers have endeavored to empower the ordinary people and promote political responsiveness to the poor, we do not know much about the conditions under which interventions reduce government's bias against the underprivileged. In this article, we conduct ``structural synthesis'' to inform the evolution of the policy responsiveness research programs. Drawing upon survey outcomes from Africa and Latin America, we show that (1) the poor believe their governments are less responsive to their demands, and (2) their policy priorities significantly differ from those of the affluent. We then compile observational and experimental evidence on strategies to promote responsiveness to the poor and synthesize the insights from the literature with a formal model. The model suggests that the most effective way to reduce the responsiveness bias against the poor is to assess local contexts precisely (in terms of electoral competitiveness) and implement the best combination of interventions accordingly. We contribute to the literature of political accountability and responsiveness by offering a coherent theoretical framework which we can directly use to reinterpret existing evidence and to derive improved interventions.

@unpublished{touolameda_placeholder1,
  author = {Touola Meda, Francis},
  title  = {[Paper Title Here]},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Working paper}
}

This paper explores how autocrats manage the dual challenge of relying on officials who could also threaten their rule. Using a political agency and accountability model, the study examines the appointment strategies autocrats use when officials might use their position to stage a coup. When threats to the ruler are low, appointments are based on performance, allowing rulers to identify competence. However, as the risk of removal rises, rulers shift away from performance-based appointments, increasing the chances of promoting underperformers. This tactic blurs the distinction between competent and incompetent officials, making demonstrations of ability uninformative and undermining credible leadership claims. The paper challenges traditional views of the loyalty-competence trade-off, clarifying the difference between faithfulness and loyalty, and demonstrates that such appointment strategies lead to economic inefficiency. These findings offer new insights into the mechanisms of elite selection in autocracies and contribute to our understanding of regime stability and inefficiency under authoritarian rule.

@unpublished{touolameda_placeholder1,
  author = {Touola Meda, Francis},
  title  = {[Paper Title Here]},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Working paper}
}

Structural transformation — the movement of firms and workers from low-productivity informal activities into higher-productivity formal sectors — remains limited across much of Sub-Saharan Africa despite sustained growth. This project examines whether weak state capacity constrains transformation not only through low revenues, but through unpredictable and discretionary taxation that discourages firm formalization and investment. Focusing on Nigeria, We leverage the country’s newly introduced tax reforms to evaluate whether implementing existing provisions in a predictable, rule-based manner — without introducing new taxes or legal changes — can expand the tax base, strengthen fiscal capacity, and promote productivity-enhancing reallocation. We implement a randomized controlled trial across Local Government Areas, targeting semi-urban towns where informal SMEs are concentrated. The intervention will standardize SME tax assessment and link incremental revenues to visible public investment. Outcomes include firm formalization, public revenues, investment, and sectoral reallocation. The project, we hope, will provide policy-relevant evidence on how predictable implementation of tax reforms can support inclusive structural transformation in low-capacity settings.